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ABSTRACT 12 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) has gained 13 
international attention over the past decade, as manifested in both United Nations policy 14 
discussions and hundreds of voluntary projects launched to earn carbon-offset credits. There 15 
are on-going discussions about whether and how projects should be integrated into national 16 
efforts under the Paris Agreement. One consideration is whether these projects have 17 
generated additional impacts over and above national policies and other conservation 18 
measures. To help inform these discussions, we compare the crediting baselines established 19 
ex-ante by voluntary REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon to counterfactuals constructed 20 
ex-post based on the quasi-experimental synthetic control method. We find that the crediting 21 
baselines assume consistently higher deforestation than counterfactual forest loss in synthetic 22 
control sites. This gap is partially due to decreased deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon 23 
during the early implementation phase of the REDD+ projects considered here. This suggests 24 
that forest carbon finance must strike a balance between controlling conservation investment 25 
risk and ensuring the environmental integrity of carbon emission offsets. Relatedly, our 26 
results point to the need to better align project- and national-level carbon accounting. 27 
Keywords: Impact evaluation; synthetic control; payment for environmental services; carbon 28 
credit; deforestation. 29 
Significance 30 
There are efforts to integrate the reduced carbon emissions from avoided deforestation 31 
claimed by voluntary REDD+ projects into national greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 32 
inventories.  This requires careful consideration of whether and how much of the reduced 33 
carbon emissions can be attributed to projects. However, credible evidence on the 34 
effectiveness of such voluntary activities is limited. We adopted a quasi-experimental, 35 
synthetic control method to examine the causal effects of 12 voluntary REDD+ projects in 36 
the Brazilian Amazon. We compared these ex-post estimates of impacts with the reductions 37 
in forest loss claimed by those projects based on ex-ante baselines. Results suggest that the 38 
accepted methodologies for quantifying carbon credits overstate impacts on avoided 39 
deforestation and climate change mitigation. 40 
Introduction 41 
Concerns over global warming have led both the public and private sectors to promote 42 
climate change mitigation through the reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions from 43 
deforestation and forest degradation in tropical countries––a concept known as REDD+ (1). 44 
This strategy gained international attention after 2005 as a voluntary, performance-based 45 
payment mechanism for reduced carbon emissions (2). While the regulations and capacity for 46 
national REDD+ programs are still under development in many countries, hundreds of 47 
voluntary, subnational REDD+ projects are operational worldwide (3). These projects intend 48 
to preserve forests through a variety of activities, e.g., improved monitoring and control, 49 
promotion of sustainable land uses, and engagement of local communities (4), either as 50 
proof-of-concept or to profit from the commercialization of “carbon-offset credits” (i.e., Mg 51 
CO2 removed from or not emitted to the atmosphere) in a variety of markets. While these 52 
markets do not provide the level of funding originally envisioned for national REDD+ 53 
programs, they are substantial: in 2018 alone, the volume of carbon offsets traded totaled 54 
98.4 million Mg CO2, with a market value of USD 295.7 million; a third of those credits 55 
(30.5 million Mg CO2) were generated by REDD+ projects (5). The Paris Agreement has 56 
raised thorny questions about how the carbon emission reductions claimed by these projects 57 
relate to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and national greenhouse gas (GHG) 58 
emission inventories reported to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 59 
Change (6–8). 60 
Carbon credits from REDD+ (at both the project and national levels [1]) are issued 61 
based on performance, as defined by the comparison of realized forest cover to a baseline 62 
scenario constructed by projecting the forest cover expected in the absence of REDD+ (9). 63 
These baseline scenarios typically assume a continuation of historical deforestation trends 64 
(10), and thus eventually become unrealistic counterfactuals as the regional economic and 65 
political context change. Notably, these types of changes were observed in the Brazilian 66 
Amazon during 2004–2012, a period of sharply declining rates of forest loss (11), and also 67 
during 2019, when deforestation soared again (12) (Fig. 1). Consequently, credits for reduced 68 
deforestation (or lack thereof) claimed by voluntary REDD+ projects in the Brazilian 69 
Amazon may have been artifacts of external factors rather than REDD+ activities. Further, 70 
critics of voluntary REDD+ projects have raised concerns that deforestation baselines might 71 
be intentionally inflated by profiteers seeking to financially benefit from the 72 
commercialization of superfluous credits, or “hot air” (13–15).  In addition to the direct cost 73 
of not effectively off-setting GHG emissions, the excess credits generated by these projects 74 
impose an indirect cost on legitimate climate change mitigation efforts by undercutting the 75 
price of their credits. 76 
Early efforts to address these concerns included the establishment of standards and 77 
registries for voluntary carbon-offset projects. These standards were designed to ensure the 78 
environmental integrity of carbon offsets by requiring projects to use approved carbon-79 
accounting methodologies for establishing deforestation baselines, monitoring, and reporting, 80 
all subject to third-party audits. Among those, the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) (16) has 81 
certified the greatest number of voluntary REDD+ projects worldwide (5).  82 
Despite the growing literature on local REDD+ interventions, there have only been a 83 
few evaluations of their impacts on carbon emissions using rigorous, counterfactual-based 84 
methods (17, 18). To our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically compares 85 
deforestation baselines established ex-ante with counterfactual estimates of deforestation 86 
constructed ex-post. We employ the synthetic control method to construct deforestation 87 
counterfactuals and assess the reductions in forest loss that can be attributed to voluntary 88 
REDD+ projects (19–21). We apply this method to all VCS-certified REDD+ projects for 89 
unplanned deforestation implemented in the Brazilian Amazon in the last decade (2008–90 
2017; Fig. 2 & SI Appendix, Table S1). We focus on this region for several reasons: its 91 
global relevance for conservation and REDD+; the on-going discussions in Brazil about 92 
“nesting” voluntary projects into a national REDD+ program (6–8); and the recent 93 
availability of a cadastral database (22) that allows us to define a pool of rural properties 94 
similar to the REDD+ project areas. We construct synthetic controls from donor pools of 95 
properties based on weighted combinations of accessibility and biophysical characteristics 96 
that result in the best matches of historical deforestation trends. Unlike the typical approach 97 
to crediting baselines, we then construct counterfactual deforestation scenarios based on the 98 
actual deforestation observed in those synthetic controls during the period when the REDD+ 99 
projects were operational. We evaluate whether the REDD+ projects caused additional 100 
reductions in deforestation compared to the counterfactual deforestation as represented by the 101 
synthetic controls (i.e., REDD+ additionality) and assess the robustness of our results with 102 
placebo tests (21). We also examine trends in forest loss in buffer zones around the REDD+ 103 
project areas after project implementation to assess the plausibility that any apparent 104 
reductions in deforestation may have been displaced instead (23). Finally, we contrast our 105 
counterfactuals to the crediting baselines adopted by the voluntary projects. 106 
Results 107 
Before assessing the impacts of the REDD+ projects, we explored whether the 108 
synthetic controls can accurately replicate deforestation trends in the project areas without 109 
REDD+. This “proof of concept” was implemented by dividing the pretreatment period (i.e., 110 
before project implementation) into “training” and “testing” periods. We found that the 111 
synthetic control method was able to replicate pretreatment deforestation trends reasonably 112 
well in 10 of the 12 synthetic controls (SI Appendix, Fig. S2). Our findings for the other two 113 
projects (i.e., Jari/Amapá and Suruí) must be interpreted with particular caution. 114 
Deforestation in the REDD+ areas. Overall, we find no significant evidence that voluntary 115 
REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon have mitigated forest loss. Deforestation is 116 
consistently lower in the REDD+ project site than in the synthetic control in only four of the 117 
projects (Fig. 3 & SI Appendix, Fig. S3), and this difference is only outside the confidence 118 
interval around zero established by the placebo tests in one project (Maísa; Fig. 4 & SI 119 
Appendix, Fig. S4). The only two REDD+ projects from our sample that were implemented 120 
in protected areas, i.e., Suruí and Rio Preto-Jacundá, experienced among the largest 121 
cumulative losses of forest cover after REDD+ implementation, along with Jari/Amapá (Fig. 122 
3). This is partly a function of their large project areas and the widespread forest fires that 123 
occurred in those protected areas in 2010–2011 and 2015, respectively (see SI for details). 124 
For Rio Preto-Jacundá we find much higher deforestation than in its synthetic control (which 125 
is the same order of magnitude in size); specifically, the differences between deforestation 126 
(both cumulative and annual) in the Rio Preto-Jacundá area and its synthetic controls were 127 
substantially greater than the differences between deforestation in the placebos and their 128 
synthetic controls (Fig. 4 & SI Appendix, Fig. S4).  129 
Across all projects, we find substantial differences between the deforestation baseline 130 
scenarios adopted ex-ante by the REDD+ projects and the observed forest loss (ex-post) in 131 
the synthetic controls (Fig. 5 & SI Appendix, Fig. S5). The Suruí project, implemented in an 132 
indigenous territory, is the only case where the synthetic control deforestation exceeded the 133 
baseline deforestation adopted by the project proponents. This may reflect the fact that the 134 
baseline for Suruí was developed based on a participatory, system dynamics model (24), as 135 
opposed to the assumptions based on historical deforestation trends adopted by all other 136 
projects (see SI for details). 137 
Carbon offset implications. Credits from the voluntary REDD+ projects are generally 138 
issued after a third-party audit (i.e., verification) every 1–5 years. These credits are based on 139 
the estimated carbon-emission reductions from the avoided deforestation brought about by 140 
the projects, calculated as the difference between the carbon emissions under the baseline 141 
scenario minus the observed emissions from the project area and leakage. 142 
According to the projects’ ex-ante estimates, up to 24.8 million carbon offsets could 143 
potentially have been generated by the REDD+ interventions by 2017 (Fig. 5 & SI Appendix, 144 
Table S1). According to the VCS database, only 5.4 million tradable credits from these 145 
projects have been certified and made available to offset GHG emissions from private and 146 
public sources by that year (SI Appendix, Table S1) (25). Using the synthetic control method 147 
to estimate REDD+ counterfactuals, we find no systematic evidence that the certified carbon 148 
offsets claimed by the voluntary projects in our sample (with the exception of Maísa) are 149 
associated with additional reductions in deforestation in the REDD+ areas above and beyond 150 
the background reduction in deforestation achieved in the Brazilian Amazon over the same 151 
period (11). Even for the Maísa case, our results suggest that nearly 40% of the 50 thousand 152 
tradable carbon offsets issued by the project by 2017 (SI Appendix, Table S1) may not be 153 
genuinely additional (Fig. 5). 154 
Leakage. If REDD+ implementation mitigates forest loss in project areas by effectively 155 
excluding deforestation agents, it could displace, and hence increase, deforestation next to the 156 
project areas. Shifts in deforestation after project start in 10-km buffer zones surrounding the 157 
REDD+ projects suggest that such leakage effects could have occurred in three cases (i.e., 158 
Maísa, Florestal Santa Maria, and Manoa; SI Appendix, Fig. S6). Further, leakage 159 
presupposes a direct conservation impact, and all three of the projects exhibited lower 160 
deforestation than their synthetic controls, although this estimated effect of REDD+ is only 161 
larger than the placebo tests in the Maísa project (Fig. 4 & SI Appendix, Fig. S4). It is also 162 
worth noting that while deforestation in the buffer zones of these three projects rose between 163 
the project start dates and 2017, post-intervention rates were still lower on average than in the 164 
pre-REDD+ period.  165 
Discussion 166 
Our findings partially support early skepticism about the contribution of voluntary 167 
REDD+ projects to climate change mitigation (15, 26). In particular, they raise questions 168 
about the environmental integrity of offsets calculated using deforestation counterfactuals 169 
based on the continuation of historical trends (e.g., Fig. 1). In all projects that established 170 
crediting baselines using historical trends, we find that the crediting baselines significantly 171 
overstate deforestation in comparison to the counterfactual estimates based on synthetic 172 
controls. This pattern reflects the confounding effect created by Brazil’s post-2004 efforts to 173 
control Amazonian deforestation that were uniquely successful (11, 27, 28). If carbon credits 174 
are expected to reflect changes in emissions caused by REDD+, then using historical 175 
baselines leads to excess carbon credits for projects when deforestation at the regional level 176 
drops below the historical baseline. The opposite happens when unanticipated forest threats, 177 
such as fires, emerge at the regional scale. 178 
In contrast, the synthetic control methodology uses historical trends to identify 179 
appropriate weighted combinations of comparison areas but then constructs the 180 
counterfactual based on the observed deforestation in those areas. These counterfactuals thus 181 
incorporate the effects of contemporaneous drivers of deforestation, including agricultural 182 
commodity prices, currency exchange rates, and environmental regulations (27–29). As such, 183 
the synthetic control method is less prone to incorrectly attribute changes in deforestation to 184 
REDD+.   185 
We note some caveats on our analysis. First, we base our evaluation on the project 186 
boundaries defined by the polygons available from the VCS project database, which are 187 
somewhat larger than the areas officially reported by project proponents (SI Appendix, Table 188 
S2). Most of those polygons correspond to Amazonian rural properties registered in the 189 
Brazilian Rural Environmental Registry (CAR), whose owners are legally entitled to clear up 190 
to 20% of their forest area. Second, our synthetic controls do not perfectly match the REDD+ 191 
project areas in terms of size, accessibility, and biophysical characteristics. In particular, the 192 
synthetic control for Agrocortex is only 61% the size of their project area (SI Appendix, 193 
Table A1-2). While historical deforestation is similar in the synthetic controls and project 194 
areas, clearly there is future potential for more deforestation in the larger project areas than in 195 
their smaller synthetic controls. Third, the construction of our synthetic controls may not 196 
have included all relevant structural determinants of deforestation. Lastly, the period of 197 
analysis may not have been long enough to observe significant REDD+ impacts in some 198 
cases. 199 
Despite these caveats, the weight of the evidence suggests that these projects caused 200 
less reduction in deforestation than claimed (Fig. 5 & SI Appendix, Fig. S5) and that few 201 
projects actually achieved emission reductions (30). Suspicion about the environmental 202 
integrity of carbon offsets is not restricted to REDD+ or voluntary interventions. A series of 203 
reports on other market-based initiatives for climate change mitigation, i.e., the Joint 204 
Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, 205 
also raised concerns about the true climatic contributions from certified carbon offsets. These 206 
reports suggest that about three-quarters of JI credits are unlikely to represent additional 207 
emission reductions (31) and that 73% of the potential 2013–2020 CDM credits have a low 208 
likelihood of environmental integrity (in contrast to 7% with high likelihood) (32).  209 
The projects that we evaluated may have had little additional impact because they did 210 
not adopt the most effective actions to achieve their REDD+ objectives, perhaps because of 211 
uncertainties about the future availability of funds and concerns about unfairly raising local 212 
expectations of carbon payments. Hence, our results do not imply that voluntary REDD+ 213 
projects cannot achieve their objectives if designed and implemented effectively. There is 214 
both quasi-experimental and experimental evidence that conditional payments for 215 
environmental services (PES) can effectively reduce deforestation (3, 33), and recent 216 
literature suggests that REDD+ implemented through well-designed conditional PES can 217 
deliver positive conservation outcomes (34–36). 218 
Another possible explanation for the lack of impact is difficulty with the on-the-ground 219 
implementation and execution of activities envisioned by project proponents (37, 38). One 220 
example is the Suruí project, which attracted international attention as one of the first 221 
voluntary REDD+ interventions implemented in an indigenous territory (4). The project 222 
aimed to use the financial revenues from carbon sales to promote sustainable land-use 223 
practices in the Suruí territory but was not able to prevent the illegal invasion of loggers and 224 
miners. 225 
A third possible explanation for under-performance relates to challenges with the 226 
commercialization of carbon offsets and correspondingly limited revenues available to 227 
implement project activities (39). One way that voluntary REDD+ projects overcome that 228 
challenge is by claiming “retroactive credits” (40). Often, projects that are certified in a given 229 
year claim to have started much earlier (SI Appendix, Table S1). As a result, those projects 230 
are eligible to issue large amounts of carbon offsets at the time of certification, retroactively 231 
corresponding to the period between the certification and the project start date. This can help 232 
to fund project start-ups, but it also implies that projects have not actually had access to 233 
carbon revenues during their early years of operation. Carbon crediting rules may thus 234 
partially explain why we find limited evidence for avoided deforestation.  235 
Our results emphasize the need to reassess approaches to measuring project 236 
additionality. While ex-post counterfactual methods such as illustrated here would ensure a 237 
high level of environmental integrity, they would introduce substantial uncertainty about the 238 
credits that can be obtained from a given reduction in deforestation in project areas. An 239 
alternative approach often suggested in the literature is to require projects to adopt national or 240 
subnational (jurisdictional) baselines that are predefined, and periodically updated, by the 241 
government (6, 7, 41), as well as default carbon-stock values or a common carbon-density 242 
map (42). Imposing one common baseline would have the benefits of facilitating the 243 
inclusion of carbon emission reductions claimed by decentralized initiatives into national 244 
GHG emission inventories, ensuring consistency in the treatment of leakages, and avoiding 245 
double-counting reductions (6, 8, 43), while still offering relative certainty about carbon 246 
credits conditional on project performance. However, national and subnational baselines are 247 
typically based on historical data and thus are not any more likely to capture 248 
contemporaneous deforestation drivers and their dynamism (although it is also possible to 249 
apply the synthetic control method to nations [30]). Thus, they do not address the main 250 
problem identified by our analysis: the limitations of historical data for baseline development. 251 
Periodic baseline updates based on recent deforestation trends could help mitigate the 252 
influence of factors external to voluntary REDD+ projects on the carbon credits that they 253 
claim. In fact, current VCS rules already require projects to revise their baselines every 10 254 
years (16). Our results suggest that this interval should be shorter. Baseline updates could be 255 
based on control areas that share similar characteristics as the REDD+ projects, as 256 
demonstrated in this study with the construction of the synthetic controls. In addition, 257 
coupled human-natural system models, such as was used in the Suruí case, can be used to 258 
explore alternative baseline scenarios and quantify the potential downside risks involved in 259 
conservation investments under dynamic patterns of land-use change, though at increased 260 
project development costs (24). These models could also shed light on the potential impacts 261 
of REDD+ on local livelihoods and biodiversity (45, 46), which we do not consider here but 262 
recognize as fundamentally important. 263 
We do provide empirical evidence for a phenomenon that was anticipated in the early 264 
policy debate over REDD+ (47), i.e., de facto additionality of REDD+ projects depends on 265 
both project implementation and national circumstances. Carbon finance and crediting 266 
systems must safeguard against both “hot air” from overstated claims of carbon additionality 267 
and excessive risks to private conservation investments associated with desirable government 268 
action to combat deforestation, as observed in Brazil from 2005 to 2012. 269 
Materials and Methods 270 
We examined the impacts of 12 voluntary REDD+ projects implemented in the 271 
Brazilian Amazon since 2008 and certified under the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) before 272 
May 2019 to curb local unplanned deforestation (Fig. 2; SI Appendix, Tables S1 & S2). 273 
Project areas were defined by the geospatial polygons reported by the project proponents and 274 
available from the VCS project database. Ten of the 12 projects were implemented in 275 
privately owned properties, whereas the other two, the Suruí and the Rio Preto-Jacundá 276 
projects, were implemented in an indigenous territory and a sustainable-use reserve, 277 
respectively. Following VCS-approved carbon-accounting methodologies, historical 278 
deforestation rates were the basis of all project deforestation baselines with the exception of 279 
the Suruí project (e.g., Fig. 1). In the latter, baseline deforestation rates were informed by a 280 
participatory, and community-specific, system dynamics model (24).  281 
Rigorous impact evaluations rely on the establishment of credible counterfactuals for 282 
what would have happened in the absence of an intervention (48, 49), which are 283 
unobservable. We construct “synthetic controls” to serve as counterfactuals for the REDD+ 284 
project areas (19, 50). We adopted the synthetic control approach, as opposed to more 285 
traditional methods from the impact evaluation literature (e.g., difference-in-differences 286 
estimator), because of our small number of treated units and likely heterogeneity of the 287 
treatment across them (49, 51, 52). Synthetic controls were constructed as a weighted average 288 
of selected donor units through a nested optimization procedure that minimizes the 289 
differences in pretreatment characteristics between the project and the control, with 290 
characteristics weighted such that the resulting weighted average outcome of the selected 291 
donor units most closely matches the pretreatment outcome in the treated unit (20, 21). 292 
Specifically, the iterative procedure minimizes the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) of 293 
the outcome, or the sum of squared residuals between the treated unit and the synthetic 294 
control, over the pretreatment period (50). 295 
Two sets of synthetic controls were constructed as a weighted combination of areas 296 
selected from “donor pools” (19, 50) composed of Amazonian properties registered in the 297 
CAR database (22) that do not overlap with project areas and that had ≥90% forest cover in 298 
the first year of the analysis. In the first set, we used cumulative deforestation as the 299 
optimization outcome, whereas the second set was based on annual deforestation. We note 300 
that the optimization algorithm selected different groups of donors for the synthetic controls 301 
for each outcome, which allows us to use the second set as a robustness check. Donor pools 302 
were preferably based on properties from the same state as the REDD+ project and within 303 
±25% the size of the project area. Whenever the resulting synthetic controls had substantially 304 
different land areas or pretreatment annual and cumulative deforestation (i.e., before project 305 
implementation), the donor pools were expanded to all properties in the Amazon biome (see 306 
SI for details). Lastly, for the cases of persistent unbalanced synthetic controls, donor pools 307 
were expanded to properties with ±50% the size of the project area. Synthetic controls for the 308 
REDD+ projects implemented in a sustainable-use reserve (i.e., Rio Preto-Jacundá) and an 309 
indigenous territory (i.e., Suruí) were constructed based on donor pools composed of other 310 
sustainable-use reserves and indigenous territories, respectively. 311 
The spatial covariates structurally related to deforestation (29) used for the construction 312 
of the synthetic controls were obtained from official maps produced by government agencies 313 
in Brazil (SI Appendix, Fig. S7 & Table S4). The covariates represent (i) property size, (ii) 314 
initial forest cover, (iii) slope, (iv) soil quality, and distances from (v) state capitals, (vi) 315 
towns, (vii) federal highways, and (viii) local roads, as well as the proportion of (ix) primary 316 
and (x) secondary forest, (xi) pastureland, (xii) agriculture, and (viii) urban areas in 2000, 317 
2004, 2008, and 2012 (for projects implemented after 2012) within 10-km buffer zones of the 318 
project and potential donor areas. In accordance with the previous literature (20, 50), we also 319 
used the pretreatment annual and cumulative deforestation rates to inform the construction of 320 
the two sets of synthetic controls. Temporal land-use information in the buffer zones was 321 
obtained from the TerraClass dataset produced by Brazil’s National Institute for Space 322 
Research (INPE). Annual deforestation data for the 2001–2017 period were processed from 323 
the MapBiomas land-use/cover dataset v.3.1 for the Brazilian Amazon biome (Fig. 2 & SI 324 
Appendix, Fig. S1). 325 
While the construction of our synthetic controls was based on all information available 326 
from 2001 to the project start year (i.e., pretreatment period), we conducted a separate 327 
analysis in which a different set of synthetic controls were constructed based on data 328 
constrained to the first-half of the pretreatment period (i.e., “training” period), so they could 329 
be tested against the second-half (i.e., “testing” period; SI Appendix, Fig. S2). We evaluated 330 
the outcome of this analysis both visually and by comparing training and testing MSPE (SI 331 
Appendix, Table S3). This “proof of concept” differs from standard model-validation 332 
practices because the donors selected as synthetic controls based on the first-half of the 333 
pretreatment periods do not necessarily match the final set of donors when the full 334 
pretreatment period is used. 335 
We examined the robustness of our findings with a series of placebo tests, in which we 336 
create synthetic controls for all CAR polygons in the donor pool (i.e., not subject to REDD+ 337 
activities) and compute the difference in both annual and cumulative deforestation between 338 
each placebo and its synthetic control (Fig. 4 & SI Appendix, Fig. S4). Because placebo areas 339 
are not exposed to REDD+, any differences in forest loss between placebos and their 340 
synthetic controls are statistical “noise.” In order to increase the number of placebo tests, we 341 
use the expanded placebo donor pools of all Amazonian properties with ±50% the project 342 
size. In accordance with the previous literature (21), we discarded placebo tests with 343 
pretreatment MSPE five times higher than the pretreatment MSPE of the REDD+ polygon. 344 
We used the gaps in deforestation between the placebos and their respective synthetic 345 
controls to create 99% confidence intervals around the mean placebo effect estimate, which is 346 
approximately zero in all cases. Analyses were conducted with the Synth package (v.1.1) 347 
available for R software (v.3.6.0) (50). Lastly, we computed the annual deforestation in 10-348 
km buffer zones surrounding the project areas as an indicator of possible leakage effects (23), 349 
i.e., because increasing deforestation could reflect the displacement of deforestation due to 350 
the REDD+ activities.  351 
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Figure legends 
Fig. 1. Annual deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon from PRODES data (bars). Blue bars 
indicate voluntary REDD+ project start dates. Red lines represent 10-year deforestation 
averages prior to project implementation and commonly adopted as projects’ deforestation 
baselines. 
Fig. 2. VCS-certified REDD+ projects established during 2008–2017 in the Brazilian 
Amazon forest biome. 
Fig. 3. Cumulative post-2000 deforestation in Amazonian areas with REDD+ projects (red) 
versus synthetic controls (blue). Dashed black lines are the project start dates. 
Fig. 4. Placebo tests: cumulative deforestation in REDD+ project areas minus deforestation in 
their respective synthetic controls (red), and placebos minus their respective synthetic 
controls (blue dots). Dashed black lines are the project start dates (assumed the same for 
placebos). Shaded blue areas represent 99% confidence intervals around the mean of the 
placebos. The number of placebos varies by project based on whether synthetic controls with 
low mean squared prediction error could be constructed for the placebo tests. 
Fig. 5. Cumulative deforestation from the baseline scenarios adopted by the REDD+ projects 
(orange) versus observed cumulative deforestation in the synthetic controls (blue). Dashed 
black lines are the project start dates. 
 
